Most observers struggle to understand the role played by different factions within Iran during the recent upheavals. Who was fighting whom?
Gary Sick:
There are many different ways to look at the developments in Iran. One perspective that seems to have been ignored is what I regard as the cardinal role of the Revolutionary Guards.
Over the twenty years that Khamene'i has been the rahbar, or Leader, He has allied himself ever more closely with the Revolutionary Guards - to such an extent that it is no longer apparent to me who is leading and who is following. The Revolutionary Guards have been granted extraordinary influence over all functions of the Islamic Republic - military, political, economic and even Islamic. Technically, they take their orders from the Leader, but has he ever dared to contradict them? On the contrary, he seems always to court them by granting them ever-greater influence and responsibilities. [...]
[The military and economic roles of the Revolutionary Guards] combine to form an impenetrable core that arrogates to itself all authority in the Islamic Republic. Needless to say, it also provides tangible benefits to very specific groups: the Leader himself, who is thus promoted to a position not simply as first among equals but as the equivalent of an absolute monarch; the top leadership of the Revolutionary Guards, whose profitable dominance of all aspects of the government's operations is guaranteed; and the conservative politically minded clergy, who want a true theocracy with no meddling by those who are not properly anointed. The objective, quite simply, was to remove the "republic" from the Islamic Republic.
This is a formula for the kind of a militarized and nationalist corporate state under a single controlling ideology that is not dissimilar to fascist rule in an earlier day. Like fascism, it defines itself not only in terms of its own objectives but even more so by what it opposes: liberalism, individualism, unfettered capitalism, etc. There is no need to push the definition too far, since fascism tended to be specific to a particular time and set of historical circumstances. But the resemblance in nature and practice seems to justify use of the term.
All is changed, changed utterly. What happens next is unknowable, but the Islamic Republic will never again be the same.
[T]his perspective helps to illuminate some puzzling aspects of the current circumstances. Why did the regime resort to such a frantic manipulation of the vote when it was entirely possible that Ahmadinejad would have made a respectable showing - or possibly even have narrowly won - a fair election, and when the opposition in any event was devoted to the concept of the Islamic Republic as it existed? The answer may be that the corporate entity saw this election as one of the final steps in cementing its absolute control. Accepting the Islamic Republic as it is and not as they wanted it to be was simply unacceptable. The emergence of a relatively mild reformer - or even a substantial reformist vote - would undercut the kind of absolute authority that they were getting ready to assert. It would, in a word, complicate the coup that they were in the process of carrying out.
[W]here are the people of Iran in all this? Certainly they would be better off under a reformist government, rather than the smothering absolutism of the oligarchy. It was the brief glimpse of that possibility that brought them to the streets in the millions. They also sensed, as did the oligarchs, that there was a possibility that the existing regime would splinter and result in more humane governance.
The willingness of the corporate clique to brutalize the people they claim to represent has for the moment pushed the fire of revolt beneath the surface. But in Yeats' immortal words: All is changed, changed utterly. What happens next is unknowable, but the Islamic Republic will never again be the same.
Will the recent protests against the re-election of President Ahmadinejad have a lasting impact on the nature of the Iranian regime, then? Might this be the moment at which government by ideology is transformed into government by sheer power, as arguably happened in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968?
Richard Bulliet:
The Iranian protest movement has focused on allegations of election fraud. If those allegations are not addressed in some fashion, public confidence in elections as a means of effecting change will diminish, and some disillusioned individuals will undoubtedly decide that change can only be achieved through non-constitutional means. If underground political activist groups form, the government will assuredly enhance its surveillance and repression capabilities. Escalation in a contest between protest and repression could lead to more severe regime challenges some five to ten years from now. However, this would be more reminiscent of what happened in Iran after the coup against Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 than what happened in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet Union played a role that has no Iranian analogue. Elections under the Shah were widely seen as farcical, and underground political movements and secret police repression grew proportionately. The result was a revolution twenty-five years later. Given today's means of communication, through which young Iranians have gained a much greater awareness of international norms of political and social life than their predecessors had in the 1950s and 1960s, and given the fact that the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has no Great Power backing comparable to what the United States afforded the Shah after 1953 in the context of the Cold War, it seems more likely that a serious challenge would arise in well under 25 years.
Students and young people will be the easiest to repress...
Eden Naby:
The question of "face" enters into the picture as does the fear of an increasingly disenchanted population. The regime, especially Ahmadenejad, has lost face in the region and internationally. He, and the theocratic system that backs him, can no longer claim to speak for the people: they must resort to the "God's command as we absolutely know it to be" argument.
Even within the dominantly Muslim region, this argument weakens Tehran, especially as coupled with the latent fear of Iranian hegemony supported on the "Arab street." Ahmadenejad in particular had gained a certain hero status for appearing to defy the West even in the Sunni Arab world. Largess from oil funds to Hezbollah and Hamas - one Arab Shi'ite and the other Arab Sunni - became part of this defiance. This basis for his popularity will diminish greatly if he is seen as the murderer of his own people. In part, Iran's nuclear stance is based on defiance. If the defiance stance is diminished - as it has been - then will the position of the Arab states and Turkey, who do not want a nuclear Iran, be strengthened?
In order to resume their path toward the bluster, if not the actuality of regional hegemony, the Iranian government must deflect the accusation that they are brutal and undemocratic. They are pursuing two paths to achieve this goal. First, they are blaming the UK, US and Israel - an old saw that they may not be able to pull off yet again. Second, they have begun the process completely to repress and send into their own form of "gulag" any and everyone involved in the opposition.
Who was involved and can they be repressed? There were three categories: students and young people; intellectual and non-bazaari middle class people; and members of Majlis, the Iranian Parliament. The first category will be the easiest to repress: they can be "disappeared," forced out of universities and jobs, or executed after sham trials in which they confess to being foreign stooges. Their parents, the second category, will be terrified for their progeny and may be easily blackmailed into silence. The members of Majlis, 180 (out of 290) of whom begged off attending the inauguration of the re-elected president, will find it hard to escape punishment. Punishment may not be immediate, but slow elimination, starting with exclusion from the lists of those who can stand for the next legislative election, will take place.
What, in your opinion, are the underlying causes for the recent protests? Are they primarily directed against perceived electoral fraud or was this merely the occasion for airing more fundamental grievances?
How will the government deal with these underlying grievances? Repression seems to be the only option.
Eden Naby:
Electoral fraud appears to have taken place without much doubt - at least in the case of the Moussavi count in Tabriz, his home region. And if they manipulated electoral results in Tabriz, then they also did so elsewhere. Hence the chances are that if you took a poll of the middle class, they would doubt the authenticity of this election whether or not they themselves had voted for Ahmadenejad.
That said, there certainly has been an accumulation of grievances, especially among women and the parents of girls. Keep in mind that the sudden decreed fecundity of Iranian women during the early 1980s has created many problems for the country. For whatever reason, 60% of university students are women. Given that the unequal position of women has been an overt issue over the past 2 years, underlying the dissatisfaction is the increased educational level of women and their lack of opportunity. That women played a major role in the demonstrations represents this underlying and fundamental dissatisfaction.
How will the government deal with these underlying grievances? Repression seems to be the only option. Compromise has already been ruled out in the widespread arrests of women leaders this winter.
Richard Bulliet:
I don't believe that grievances against the regime as such were the primary driver in the election protests. Given the absence of political parties and the role of the Guardian Council in vetting candidates for office, Iranian elections have not been free by international standards. Nevertheless, they have hitherto been perceived in Iran as reasonably representative of the wishes of the voters. Well established figures have occasionally lost elections, and lesser known individuals have sometimes won. So the current challenge to the electoral process reflects an anger that is not easily reducible to a particular ideological stance. Assuming that there was serious election manipulation, as several statistical studies have indicated, the rationale for deciding to interfere with the electoral process probably stems more from a concern over the changing profile of the electorate than over a concrete and specific ideological challenge. After all, Mr. Mousavi, the person around whom most of the protestors rallied, has no credentials as an opponent of the Islamic Republican form of government. In terms of the profile of the electorate, however, the baby boom generation of Iranians born during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when the regime was wedded to a pro-natalist philosophy and the country's fertility index was over 7 children per woman (as opposed to barely over 2 today), has now fully entered the electorate. In ten years they will dominate the middle ranks of employment throughout the country.
For many (though not all) Iranians of the slightly older generation who lived through the revolution and bore the brunt of the fighting against Iraq, these young people seem hedonistic, self-centered, and lacking in religious zeal. The older cohort, particularly those who have benefited from veterans' preferences and involvement in the politically active branches of the armed forces (the Revolutionary Guards and Basij Corps), do not want to see their lives of sacrifice go for naught in a wave of popular Westernization. This kind of clash typically takes place 25-30 years after a revolutionary change--compare Algeria in 1992, China under the Cultural Revolution, and the Stalinist purges after World War II--and it is also analogous to the conflict between America's generation of veterans and the hippie, antiwar counterculture of the 1970s. In other words, the protests in Iran fit a pattern of generational conflict in which ideology as such is less important than the inevitable process of one generation aging and another pushing ahead.
Can an accommodation between hardliners and reformers be ruled out by now? Can we venture an educated guess about the outcome of the Revolution?
Gary Sick:
Based on my own experience of watching the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis from the White House thirty years ago: don't expect that this will be resolved cleanly with a win or loss in short period of time. The Iranian revolution, which is usually regarded as one of the most accelerated overthrows of a well-entrenched power structure in history, started in about January 1978 and the shah departed in January 1979. During that period, there were long pauses and periods of quiescence that could lead one to believe that the revolt had subsided. This is not a sprint; it is a marathon. Endurance is at least as important as speed.
There may not be a clear winner or loser. Iranians are clever and wily politicians. They prefer chess to football, and a "win" may involve a negotiated solution in which everyone saves face. The current leadership has chosen, probably unwisely, to make this a test of strength, but if they conclude that it is a no-win situation they could settle for a compromise. The shape of a compromise is impossible to guess at this point, but it would probably involve significant concessions concealed behind a great public show of unity.
They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose.
Leadership is key. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the rahbar or Leader, has chosen - again probably unwisely - to get out in front as the spokesman of the regime. Unlike his predecessor, the father of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini, he has openly taken sides with one faction over another. He is clearly speaking for the ultra conservative leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and their equally reactionary clerical supporters, who fear any possible threat to their dominant power. Curiously, President Ahmadinejad has largely vanished from sight, which adds to the impression that he is more of a pawn than a prime mover in this affair.
On the other side is Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the erstwhile colleague and now principal antagonist of the rahbar. He has chosen, as he usually does, to stay behind the scenes as a master strategist, leaving the public field to Mir Hossein Mousavi and the other disappointed candidates and their followers.
The irony of two former colleagues now competing for power over the expiring corpse of the Islamic Republic that they created with such grandiose expectations, is lost on no one. The important subtext, however, is that these two understand very well what they are doing. They know how a revolt can be turned into a revolution. They also know they have everything to lose. The shared consciousness of high stakes has until now prevented an all out political confrontation between rival factions in the elite. That may help explain why the rahbar and the Revolutionary Guards were so reckless in their insolent contempt of the reformers and the public. They may have believed that no one would dare take it to this level.
Now that it has arrived at this point, both protagonists are faced with decisions of unprecedented gravity. There has been nothing like this in the thirty year history of the Islamic Republic, and today there is no Khomeini father figure to moderate and mediate among the warring factions. They must improvise in conditions of severe uncertainty. If anyone tells you that they know how this will turn out, treat their words with the same regard you would have for any fortune teller peering into a crystal ball.
Can the United States have a positive impact on the situation in Iran?
Gary Sick:
For the United States, the watchword should be Do No Harm. The situation in Iran is being exploited for short term domestic political purposes by those who have been looking for an opening to attack the Obama administration. Wouldn't it feel good to give full throated expression to American opposition to the existing power structure in Iran? Perhaps so -- but it could also be a fatal blow to the demonstrators risking their lives on the streets of Tehran, and it could scotch any chance of eventual negotiations with whatever government emerges from this trial by fire.
The crisis in Iran is an Iranian crisis and it can only be resolved by the Iranian people and their leaders. There is no need to conceal our belief in freedom of speech and assembly and our support for the resolution of political disputes without bloodshed. But we should not be stampeded by domestic political concerns into pretending that our intervention in this crisis could be anything but pernicious.
Can President Obama play chess as well as he plays basketball?
The Iranian constitution combines theocracy with democracy. Could such a mix ever be stable?
"Israel may ... be seen as a model for a transitional Iran"
Eden Naby:
The other theocracy/democracy combination is Israel. But the difference between the two is enormous: Israeli theocracy extends deep into family law but less deep into political control of institutions. Agitation for change and modification does not draw down the wrath of god expressed by human hands. If anything, Israel may in fact provide the combination of theocracy and democracy that could be seen as a model for a transitional Iran.
That would be ironic, wouldn't it, to have Iran's theocracy modeled on Israel?
Theocracy in one form or other still lingers in vestigial forms in many countries: but Saudi Arabia and Iran stand out as the worst exemplars. Moreover, the idealized theocracy, built into the educational systems, renders change difficult for people to understand because they have no opportunity to debate or realize there are alternatives.
'The Supreme Leader is not far different from what we would have in the United States if we had only one Supreme Court justice'
Richard Bulliet:
The Iranian constitution establishes a religious figure as the overseer of the political system. Yet that religious figure is not a divinely selected Imam who is deemed to be infallible. Clerics popularly elected to an Assembly of Experts choose him. More importantly, the dominant understanding of Islamic law in Iranian Shi'ism accords to the highest-ranking clerics the capacity to change or adapt religious law in response to current conditions. Though the law is based on the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, it is not an immutable code, and the interpretation of it by contemporary religious jurists is considered provisional insofar as the only truly authoritative voice is that of the Twelfth Imam, who departed from human society over a thousand years ago leaving no sure indication of when he would return. So what we have, in effect, is not far different from what we would have in the United States if we had only one Supreme Court justice.
To sharpen this example, consider what the American political scene would be like if every proposal by President Obama would ultimately have to be approved by Justice Antonin Scalia, a supreme jurist appointed for life. Whether the "governing jurist" (vali faqih in Persian) emerges from a seminary in Qom as a specialist in Shi'ite law or from Harvard Law School as a specialist in constitutional law is not all that important. The U.S. Constitution can be amended, but only with difficulty; the same is true of Shi'ite law. The ultimate problem, therefore, is not theocracy vs. democracy but democracy vs. juridical monarchy. What this means is that the problems that are preventing the Islamic Republic of Iran from achieving a stable system come from the implementation of the founder's idea of a governing jurist, not simply from the idea of that jurist being religiously trained. In other words, the IRI might achieve a workable democracy if the function of the governing jurist were shared by a panel of individuals, and if the Guardian Council, an institution stemming from Iran's Constitutional Revolution of 1906, were eliminated.
Do the Reformers - and does Moussavi - hope to take theocracy out of Iran, or merely to reform it?
Gary Sick:
Mir Hossein Mousavi, the presidential candidate who has come to represent the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people, issued a formal statement on June 21st. Although he denounces the "lies and fraud" of the leadership, particularly in the recent election, he views the fraudulent election as only as the symptom of something far more serious. He describes a revolution gone wrong, a revolution that was originally based on attention to the voice of the people but has resulted in "forcing an unwanted government on the nation."
This moment is "a turning point," he says, and he defines the " the movement that is forming around him of having a "historical mission" to accomplish nothing less than "renewing the life of the nation" according to its own ideals.
No one knows where any of the parties are likely to go next. It is like standing on the edge of a glacier and feeling the ice begin to crack under your feet.
He acknowledges, interestingly, that his own voice at the beginning was less 'eloquent' than he would have wished and that the people were ahead of him in turning the movement green. But now he accepts the "burden of duty put on our shoulders by the destiny of generations and ages"
He denounces both extremes of the political spectrum: those on one hand who believe that "Islamic government is the same as Tyranny of the Rightful;" and on the other, those who "consider religion and Islam to be blockers for realization of republicanism," i.e. those who believe that Islam and democracy are incompatible.
Mousavi says his call for annulment of the election and a revote, supervised by an impartial national body, "is a given right." The objective is nothing less than "to achieve a new type of political life in the country."
That is truly a revolutionary statement. He says he will stand by the side of all those seeking "new solutions" in a non-violent way. He accepts the principles and the institutions of the Islamic Republic, including the Revolutionary Guard and the basij, but denounces "deviations and deceptions." He demands reform "that returns us to the pure principles of the Islamic Revolution."
He calls for freedom of expression in alll its forms, and says that if the government permits people to express their views "there won't be a need for the presence of military and regulatory forces in the streets."
It is apparent from this statement that Mousavi's movement -- and Mousavi himself -- have evolved enormously in the past week. The candidate started as a mild-mannered reformer. After the searing events of the past several days, he has dared to preach a counter sermon to Khamene'i's lecture on Islamic government. Although he never mentions the Leader by name, there is no overlooking the direct contradiction of his arguments. This open opposition to the Leader by a political figure is unprecedented.
Mousavi has in fact issued a manifesto for a new vision of the Islamic Republic. The repression and disdain of the government has brought the opposition to a place they probably never dreamed of going. And no one knows where any of the parties are likely to go next.
But for outside observers, it is like standing on the edge of a glacier and feeling the ice begin to crack under your feet.
Do you think it is possible for liberal democracies to exist peacefully alongside Islamic theocracies?
Eden Naby:
No. These two philosophies are in opposition because Islamic theocracies cannot lose any argument when religion is their ultimate answer to any human rights, economic, social or political issue. In Shi'ism in particular, where interpretation of Shari'a can be done as a matter of routine by religious leaders, hopes for democracy are crushed when those leaders are backed by bullets.
Iran is now a very dangerous country. Having lost "face" and credibility inside the country, and in the region, it cannot risk compromise or any further loss of power for its current leaders. It is hard to imagine any factors that would induce the Iranian regime to voluntarily give up power. These men, bloated with wealth acquired in 30 years of lining their pockets, do not share the kind of concern that the Shah had to not kill Iranians, especially after the catastrophe at Jaleh Square. Doing the work of God allows these men to kill with impunity - whether they are Ayatollahs giving the orders to shoot and bludgeon, torture and try, hang or make disappear or the fanatical minions represented by the basij. This situation makes Iran's ability eventually to produce a nuclear bomb even more unacceptable. Where would the regime stop in order to maintain itself and promote the word of God?
I don't see Iran as a theocracy. It is a constitutionally flawed democracy
Richard Bulliet:
I don't see the IRI as a theocracy. It is a constitutionally flawed democracy. I am also suspicious of the term "liberal democracy." It makes sense to contrast a "liberal democracy" with a fascist, communist, militarist, or other regime type that regularly holds bogus referenda to endorse the policies of the autocracy; but there is a long history of such pseudo-democracies coexisting with democracies that regularly hold free, fair, and credible elections. The United States, for example, treats Egypt as a close ally even though there is nothing "liberal" about Egyptian elections. So is the question whether the Islamic Republic of Iran can exist peacefully with a "liberal" United States? Or with an "illiberal" Egypt? I would say that it can live peacefully with either, particularly if the flaws in its constitution are corrected. On the other hand, if by "Islamic theocracy" you are talking about Saudi Arabia or the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, I think there is a more serious question to be raised about long-term coexistence. Yet again I would observe that the United States, a "liberal democracy," considers Saudi Arabia, an "Islamic theocracy" the best of friends.
To what extent will the re-election of President A impact upon efforts to effect a rapprochment with Iran with respect to their nuclear programme?
I don't think it makes much difference who is President in Iran.
Eden Naby:
Rapprochement with Iran has receded. Nuclear breaks through heavy sanctions are in order. But the door to dialogue cannot be closed. If the regime becomes repressive enough, some who sense an opportunity to benefit from the disrepute of the current murderers will succeed in rising from within the ranks of the ruling class.
Richard Bulliet:
The best achievable outcome in the nuclear arena is probably international recognition of Iran as a threshold nuclear power with a probable, but undeclared and untested, weapons capability. The question, to my mind, is not how to keep Iran from continuing its uranium enrichment program, but how to persuade Iran that any manifest departure from its oft repeated denial of a nuclear weapons ambition--this means any test of a weapon--would not be in its interest. I think a carefully calibrated relaxation of international pressure through diplomatic initiatives and selective removal of sanctions would be more effective than a ratcheting up of those sanctions. If Iran were tacitly accorded the respect appropriate to its status as a threshold nuclear power, I think that the desire for a continuing improvement in international relations would prove more effective in staving off a weapon test than punitive sanctions that could backfire by rallying the nation behind nuclearization. In this context, I don't think it makes much difference who is president in Iran.
Gary Sick, a member of the US Security Council under the Ford, Carter and Reagan administrations, was the principal White House aide for Persian Gulf affairs during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis.
Richard Bulliet, Professor of History at the Middle East Institute of Columbia University, is the author of numerous books about Iran and the Middle East.
Dr. Eden Naby is a cultural historian of Assyrian-Iranian descent with a special interest in multi-ethnic settings in Muslim dominant states: Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq.
Interviews with Richard Bulliet and Eden Naby were conducted via e-mail. Texts by Gary Sick are drawn, with friendly permission, from his blog: gary's choices.